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Abstract 
 
1. The main aim of the article is to provide up-to-date knowledge of environmental 
aesthetics for an interdisciplinary audience, and to signal the importance of 
research in this area for studying people-nature relationships.  
2. Environmental aesthetics has emerged in the last fifty years from the 
philosophical fields of aesthetics and environmental philosophy. Other 
disciplinary perspectives have also shaped environmental aesthetics, including 
landscape architecture, human geography, restoration ecology, and empirical 
studies on landscape preferences in developmental and environmental 
psychology.  
3. This review and synthesis mainly addresses the theoretical approaches and 
concepts that provide a framework to the key debates in the field, but also 
considers how empirical approaches have shaped recent developments, and 
how conceptual issues arise with respect to empirical cases.  
4. We outline the background and context of environmental aesthetics, its key 
concepts, and provide a critical review of contemporary theories in the field. We 
then consider how aesthetics features in issues pertaining to the conservation, 
preservation, and restoration of nature.  
5. Finally, we identify some new directions for environmental aesthetics scholarship, 
that can productively contribute to ongoing debates regarding various 
relationships between people and nature.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Environmental aesthetics has emerged in the last fifty years from the philosophical 
fields of aesthetics and environmental philosophy. The questions and issues which 
shape this subfield have been drawn principally from the Western philosophical 
tradition. Other disciplinary perspectives have also shaped environmental aesthetics, 
including landscape architecture, human geography, restoration ecology, and empirical 
studies on landscape preferences in developmental and environmental psychology. 
This review and synthesis mainly addresses the theoretical approaches and concepts 
that provide a framework to the key debates in the field, but also considers, to some 
extent, how empirical approaches have shaped recent developments, and how 
conceptual issues arise with respect to empirical cases. We note that our expertise and, 
thus, the expertise of this review, is primarily confined to UK, European, and North 
American scholarship. 
 
2. Aesthetics, Nature and Value 
 
What is meant by ‘aesthetic’ in the philosophical sense? ‘Aesthetic experience‘, 
‘aesthetic response’,  ‘aesthetic appreciation’, and ‘aesthetic judgment’ are commonly 
understood by philosophers as centred in human perception and the senses, and these 
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terms are often interpreted as referring to human experiences involving feeling/affect 
and imagination, rather than being centred on the acquisition of knowledge (Shelley, 
2013; Parsons, 2008).1 Aesthetic experience is considered the basis of aesthetic value 
and has been characterised as based in a feeling of pleasure or admiration in response 
to perceptual qualities, forms, and meanings in relation to an object (Levinson, 1996; 
Stecker, 2006).2  
 
Although the study of the general field of aesthetics reaches back to classical 
philosophy, aesthetics was first named in 1735 by Alexander Baumgarten who defined it 
as the ‘science of sensory cognition’ (quoted in Guyer, 2014: 5).  In the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, in Britain and on the Continent, aesthetics emerged as an 
important subfield of philosophy. During this time, many philosophers (for example, 
Francis Hutcheson, Edmund Burke, Immanuel Kant and Arthur Schopenhauer) 
discussed both the arts and aesthetics of nature, including ‘wild’ nature and designed 
landscapes such as gardens (Carlson, 2009; Brady, 2013; Paden et al., 2013).3 Today, 
the field of aesthetics is commonly described as a branch of philosophy which studies 
concepts and questions related to the arts, architecture, design, the everyday, and 
                                               
1 Though see our discussion later about ‘scientific cognitivism’, which challenges this interpretation with 
respect to the role of knowledge.  
2 For our purposes in this review, we will use ‘aesthetic experience’, ‘aesthetic response’, ‘aesthetic 
appreciation’, and ‘aesthetic judgment’ interchangeably. ‘Object’ is used in this article, and more widely by 
aesthetic philosophers, to identify what it is that is being aesthetically appreciated. ‘Object’ can refer to an 
individual object such as a rose, a constellation of objects in a forest, ocean, landscape, sky, and so on. 
3 In the article, and with respect to environmental aesthetics, we assume that aesthetic experience and 
value relate to a dynamic variety of places, organic and inorganic matter and processes, as well as 
animals, all of which have been more and less modified or influenced by humans. We recognise that 
‘nature’ is a contested term and concept (the literature on this issue is vast. See for example: Soper,1995; 
Lorimer, 2015; Vogel, 2015). In the article, we shall use the term ‘nature’ interchangeably with ‘natural 
environment’. 
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natural and modified environments. Although the field is broad in terms of the subject 
matter of study, primacy of attention is given to the arts and has been since roughly the 
mid-nineteenth century (Carlson, 2000; 2019; Moore, 2008). Although environmental 
aesthetics has emerged as an important subfield, aesthetics remains dominated by 
discussions of the arts. 
 
In order to provide a fuller account of the nature of aesthetic experience and value, we 
turn to a brief discussion of key historical ideas which have influenced environmental 
aesthetics today. In the eighteenth century, discussions focused on the exercise of 
aesthetic judgment, or making a value judgment about the beauty of something, for 
example, ‘That rose is beautiful.’ Aesthetic judgments were commonly theorised to 
emerge from the ‘disinterested’ contemplation of perceptual qualities which, importantly, 
describes a kind of interest that is disconnected from desiring the object of the judgment 
(Kant, 2000). Below, we show how this idea has influenced more recent conceptions of 
aesthetic value as a type of non-instrumental value. In addition, aesthetic theories since 
the eighteenth century have been influential for focusing more on the subject’s response 
to qualities of objects, in contrast to the notion of beauty as an objective quality. In both 
classical and medieval notions of beauty, it was common to identify beauty and 
aesthetic value with objective qualities alone, for example, harmonious proportion 
(Sartwell, 2017; Paden et al, 2013; Tartarkiewicz, 1972). In terms of current relevance, 
this focus is significant for opening up an exploration of the subject’s aesthetic 
experience and appreciation of natural and modified environments, including the study 
of imagination, emotion, and multisensory responses. 
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We mentioned above that the field of aesthetics today has developed a somewhat 
broader scope that now includes environments and the everyday. This scope rests in 
part on the idea that aesthetic experience is not limited to exalted experiences of beauty 
or sublimity, or indeed to something which takes place within artistic institutions such as 
the gallery or opera house. Here, we see the influence of the twentieth-century 
pragmatic tradition in philosophy, which contends that the aesthetic experience arises 
through an active engagement between self and environment, and through ordinary 
activities, including both practical and intellectual pursuits (Dewey, 1980). Works of art 
can create such experiences, but also experiences in day-to-day life that stand out in 
some way, such as enjoying a special meal. We would suggest that, for example, a 
well-designed community garden might also give rise to this kind of experience. The 
pragmatic tradition is interested in understanding how aesthetic experience and the arts 
are part of everyday life, and how they might contribute to human flourishing.   
 
Both eighteenth-century aesthetic theory and the pragmatic tradition have impacted the 
development of environmental aesthetics, and although some of their ideas lie in 
contrast, they also share an interest in aesthetic experience and value as intimately 
related to the senses and perceptual absorption. Both approaches demonstrate how the 
aesthetic response emerges through the subject’s perception of qualities in the world. 
There is also a common emphasis on the active imagination and the place of feeling or 
emotion, in contrast to deeply intellectual or scientific pursuits which are often 
characterized by reasoning and logic.  
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Turning to the concept of aesthetic value, these ideas have shaped its conception within 
environmental aesthetic theories (Berleant,1992; Budd, 2002; Brady, 2003; Carlson, 
2000; 2019). In the judgment, ‘That rose is beautiful’, the aesthetic value of ‘beauty’ is 
ascribed to the object (in this case, a rose). Aesthetic value is one just one type of 
environmental value that may be ascribed to objects; in discussions about the 
environment, there are various types of value that may be ascribed, including (but not 
limited to) ecological, historical, cultural, economic, ethical, and aesthetic value. 
According to O’Neill et al. (2008), environmental values are ‘the various ways in which 
individuals, processes and places matter, our various modes of relating to them, and the 
various considerations that enter into our deliberations about action.’ (O’Neill et al., 
2008: 1). On this latter point, Kempton et al. (1995) similarly understand environmental 
values to be ‘moral guidelines’ that serve as the basis for ‘environmental concern and 
action’ (Kempton et al., 1995: 87). Thus, environmental values are normative positions 
that ascribe relative or absolute goodness or badness to certain things such as 
individuals, processes and places, but also species and other components of 
ecosystems.  
 
There is strong agreement among philosophers today that aesthetic value is a form of 
intrinsic or non-instrumental value, where something is not valued as a means to some 
end, rather it is found to have value in and for itself (O’Neill, 2003; Stecker, 2006; Brady, 
2003; Parsons, 2008). This form of value can be understood in aesthetic terms as 
appreciating something for its own sake, that is, appreciated for the individual 
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distinctiveness of the qualities of the object in question. For example, a particular forest 
might be ascribed aesthetic value in virtue of its aesthetic qualities, such as the fine 
aroma of pine, melodious birdsong, or golden shafts of light reaching through the 
canopy to the forest floor. 
 
This common interpretation of aesthetic value rests on the idea that the pleasure or 
admiration arising through aesthetic appreciation is deeply connected to aesthetic 
qualities ( ‘aesthetic quality’ refers to a quality of something that is appreciated for its 
own sake). In this respect, the focus of aesthetic experience is on the thing in question, 
rather than being directed towards one’s own satisfaction or what a person might gain 
for themselves from aesthetic experience (Stecker, 2006). The implications of these 
points are two-fold when it comes to understanding the character of aesthetic value. 
Although aesthetic value can involve pleasure or liking something, this cannot be 
detached from the object-centred appreciation of aesthetic qualities in the natural world. 
Also, while such liking may be considered a benefit to people who experience it, 
perhaps the enjoyable experience of a forest enhances their well-being, it is not the 
motivating aim of the experience but rather the outcome of aesthetic attention to the 
world.  
     
Below, we pick up on connections between aesthetic value, conservation, and 
environmental decision-making, as well as the conflicts that arise between aesthetic and 
other environmental values. Before moving to the next section, it is relevant to point out 
that aesthetic values can also be positive and negative. Aesthetic disvalue is commonly 
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articulated through the category of ‘ugliness’ (Moore, 1998; Saito, 1998a; Eco, 2011). 
There has been less attention to disvalue in both artistic and environmental aesthetics 
(Sepänmaa, 1986; Saito, 1998b; Brady, 2012), however there has been more attention 
to aesthetic value categories which involve a mixture of pleasure and displeasure, such 
as tragedy, the sublime, and neighbouring categories including awe and wonder 
(Feagin,1983; Brady, 2013; Shapshay, 2013; Paden, 2015a; Hepburn, 1984; McShane, 
2018).  
 
3. Contemporary Theories in Environmental Aesthetics 
 
In this section, we address three principal issues in contemporary theories in the field: 
(1) the distinction between art or object-focused aesthetics and environmental 
aesthetics; (2) the multisensory potential of environmental aesthetics compared to 
visual and scenic approaches; and (3) ‘cognitive’ versus ‘non-cognitive’ environmental 
aesthetics. 
 
When environmental aesthetics emerged as a new sub-field in the 1960s, philosophers 
such as Ronald Hepburn (1966), Arnold Berleant (1970), and Allen Carlson (1979) were 
keen to show what was distinctive about environmental aesthetic appreciation in 
contrast to the appreciation of the arts and other artifacts. The environmental character 
of appreciating the natural world and humanly modified environments (for example, 
parks, gardens, and agricultural landscapes) marks a significant contrast to the more 
object-centered approach typical of the arts, where paintings and sculptures are 
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experienced as relatively static because they are bounded by a frame or by their 
material (other art forms are less static, such as music, video art, film, and installations).  
 
Consider the aesthetic experience of a painting of a forest in contrast to first-hand 
experience of a forest. The actual forest is not experienced as a two-dimensional, 
unchanging surface, but rather as a complex ecosystem shaped by various organisms, 
light, water, growth, decay, the effects of weather, the seasons and so on. In contrast to 
the arts, the less constrained and more dynamic character of environments will have an 
effect on the range of aesthetic qualities that are grasped and valued by the perceiver, 
and there may also be the opportunity to perceive changes in aesthetic qualities over 
time and in light of various factors. In environmental aesthetic appreciation there is 
greater potential for immersion, for example, being enveloped by a forest, and this 
opens up opportunities for multisensory appreciation. 
 
Above, we pointed to how ideas from both eighteenth-century aesthetic theory and the 
pragmatic tradition have influenced environmental aesthetics. More specifically, they 
have influenced the common, contemporary position that aesthetic experience of nature 
begins in and is often focused through sensory perception (Hepburn, 1984; Saito, 
1998b, Berleant, 1992). Importantly, that perception is not limited to vision and, 
potentially, it draws on all of the senses. Many scholars emphasize the range of senses 
that ground aesthetic experience and judgment, and thus how the various senses shape 
aesthetic valuing of the natural world (Fisher, 1998; Prior, 2017; Thompson and Travlou, 
2009). The work of Arnold Berleant is key here, having advanced a phenomenological 
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account of environmental aesthetics, which emphasises the importance of ‘sensory 
immersion’ within a given environment that creates close intimacy (Berleant uses the 
term ‘unity’) between perceiver and environment (1992: 170).4 Similarly, Callicott (1994) 
has put forward a ‘land aesthetic’ developed from the writing of Aldo Leopold, which 
also proposes a multisensory account of aesthetic experiences, in contrast to purely 
visual ones. The immersive, multisensory possibilities of the environmental approach 
serve to challenge narrower scenic approaches, where aesthetic valuing of nature is 
primarily placed on scenic and visual qualities. The ‘scenic model’, as it is sometimes 
called in environmental aesthetics, treats nature as a fixed scene to be gazed at, rather 
than as environmental and ecological, with all of the dynamic, changing and 
spontaneous processes that constitute nonhuman nature (Carlson, 2000; 2010; 
Gobster, 1999).This scenic model can be traced back, at least, to the Picturesque 
movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, where landscapes were judged 
as aesthetically pleasing according to standards of human design, such as gardens and 
landscape paintings (Porteous, 1996; Carlson, 2000; Saito, 1998a).5 Below, we discuss 
how this model has played a role in landscape assessment. 
 
While there is general agreement that broader, richer approaches are needed to 
capture the potential diversity of aesthetic qualities of environments, nature, and 
landscape, the contemporary debate in environmental aesthetics has been strongly 
                                               
4 For a critique of Berleant’s phenomenological environmental aesthetics, see Parsons (2008: 89-94). 
5 Though see, for example, Paden (2015b) who offers a qualified defence of picturesque landscape 
paintings as a component of scenic aesthetic appreciation, noting that ‘...the experience of these 
[picturesque] paintings is not “distanced” and “static”; instead, they invite us into their world, and we move 
through it, back and forth, as we trace out its various relationships’ (p.57).  
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shaped by two contrasting approaches: ‘scientific cognitivism’ and ‘non-cognitivism.’ 
Scientific cognitivism holds that if appreciation is to reach beyond a superficial aesthetic 
response and issue in judgments appropriate to their objects, it must be informed by 
scientific knowledge (Carlson, 1979, 2000, 2010; Rolson,1995; Parsons, 2002). The 
most influential position within this type of approach is Allen Carlson’s (2000) ‘natural 
environmental model’. Here, aesthetic valuing emerges through sensory perception of 
aesthetic qualities in the world, but the role of knowledge is essential. His argument for 
this model is driven by an argument by analogy. In the appreciation of art, it is often held 
that the appreciator turns to art history and criticism in order to contextualise and make 
the most informed judgments of, for example, a Cubist painting (Walton, 1970). By 
analogy, and filling a similar role for aesthetic appreciation of nature, will be knowledge 
supplied by the natural sciences, for example, ecology, geology, and natural history 
more generally. It is claimed that such knowledge will support aesthetic judgments that 
are appropriate to their objects because the judgments are made from a solid 
foundation of objective knowledge. Carlson argues that if appreciating a whale under 
the category of ‘fish’ rather than ‘mammal’, might lead to a judgment of the animal as 
clumsy rather than recognising aesthetic qualities of extraordinary majesty as this very 
large mammal moves gracefully through the ocean (Carlson, 2000). It is argued that 
such knowledge provides relevant context and directs the perception of aesthetic 
qualities appropriately. The model can also support an account of aesthetic experience 
where it is possible to identify aesthetic value over disvalue. Imagine a forest that has 
been affected by a naturally occurring wildfire. Knowledge that fire may have beneficial 
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effects for the forest’s ecology can enable the appreciator to find value in what might 
otherwise seem to have ugly qualities, appearing grey, charred and lifeless. 
 
An emphasis on the role of knowledge can enable aesthetic appreciation of nature ‘on 
its own terms’ (Saito, 1998b). According to Saito’s position, which falls between 
scientific cognitivism and non-cognitivism, aesthetic valuing begins and ends in the 
sensuous surface of things, with scientific knowledge and cultural narratives such as 
myths and folklore providing further grounding for aesthetic judgments. By arguing for 
appreciation of nature ‘on its own terms’, she brings moral considerations to bear on 
aesthetic values; a position inspired by the work of Aldo Leopold. In the ‘Land Ethic’, 
Leopold’s holistic ecological thought draws upon values of beauty and aesthetics, for 
example, as shown by his well-known remark (which some scholars take as a central 
principle in his work): ‘A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, 
and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.’ (1989, 224-
225; Callicott, 1994).  
  
Various non-cognitivist theories de-emphasise the role of knowledge, however, there is 
agreement with cognitivists that it is important to avoid deep subjectivity or 
misinformation which potentially distorts our aesthetic judgments of nature. Many non-
cogntivists object to Carlson’s model for being too reductive, for example, through its 
strong emphasis on the role of scientific knowledge and the neglect of fundamental and 
richly aesthetic ways that people experience natural and semi-natural environments. 
Arnold Berleant’s influential ‘aesthetics of engagement’ (1991, 1992) makes a strong 
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case for a participatory, multisensory, and immersive aesthetic positioning and doing 
away with the subject-object dichotomy that he argues is  associated with 
‘disinterestedness’. Berleant emphasises a holistic and somatic approach, rather than 
giving a central place to scientific knowledge in aesthetic valuing: ‘[The aesthetic 
environment] is sensed through my feet, in the kinesthetic sensations of my moving 
body, in the feel of the sun and wind on my skin, in the tug of branches on my clothing, 
in the sounds from every direction that attract my attention’ (1992: 27). 
 
Many non-cognitive theories focus on bringing out significant components of aesthetic 
valuing or appreciation while recognising that other components, such as scientific 
knowledge, will still play some role. The ‘arousal model’, an emotion-based account, 
argues that scientific cognitivism fails to capture how emotional responses shape 
aesthetic appreciation (Carroll, 1993). Carroll’s theory is important because it seeks to 
show how emotions have a legitimate, non-sentimentalizing place in environmental 
aesthetic appreciation, and he draws upon various arguments in the philosophy of 
emotion to show that emotion-based aesthetic judgments can have an objective rather 
than subjective basis. 
 
A key feature of Kant’s aesthetic theory, imagination, has been brought to the fore in a 
set of positions which argue that exploratory, projective, and ampliative imaginative 
activity can enrich and deepen appreciation without falling foul to humanising or 
trivialising nature (Brady, 2003; Hepburn, 1996; Mikkonen, 2018). Hepburn, for 
example, writes that imagination enables the appreciator to ‘shift attention flexibly from 
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aspect to aspect of the natural objects before one, to shift focus from close-up to long 
shot, from textural detail to overall atmospheric haze or radiance; to overcome 
stereotyped grouping and clichéd ways of seeing’ (1984: 47). Garden design often 
creates opportunities for imagination through ‘invitation’ (Ross, 1998: 166), but it is also 
possible for natural features to invite imaginative exploration. Consider how an opening 
in a dense forest might draw in a hiker to explore the place through various senses and 
imagination. In viewing a U-shaped valley from the top of a mountain, one may be able 
to imagine the geological forces which have shaped the place over time. 
 
 
Several non-cognitivists have also objected that cognitivists naïvely accept science as 
providing the most objective grounding for aesthetic appreciation, and that they fail to 
see that subjectivity and cultural bias can also be present in the sciences (Godlovitch, 
1994; Brady, 2003; Mikkonen, 2018). The ‘acentric model’ takes this type of criticism 
further by arguing that the only appropriate form of aesthetic valuing is one that 
decentres human imposed categories of knowledge (scientific and cultural) so that 
nature is approached as ineffable, or as ‘mystery’. In so doing, it may be possible to 
recognize nature’s independence and autonomy from humans (Godlovitch, 1994). On 
the one hand, this position might seem reasonable, especially in light of the criticism 
that when people aesthetically appreciate environments, this is a human-centred 
enterprise, even hedonistic (Lee, 1995). On the other hand, although the aesthetic 
valuer and their aesthetic judgments may be described as anthropogenic, it does not 
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follow that they are anthropocentric. As discussed above, aesthetic appreciation is 
commonly theorized as valuing things for their own sake. 
 
Representing a synthesis of cognitivist and non-cognitivist positions, there are several 
pluralistic positions which argue for a range of grounds for aesthetic appreciation of 
nature (Parsons, 2008; Brady, 2016). Hepburn’s (1984, 1996) interest in multisensory 
responses and participatory, reflexive appreciation suggest many appropriate ways to 
approach nature, from thoughts, imaginings, and feelings to various kinds of knowledge 
and narratives in science, literature and the arts. With special emphasis on the role of 
perception and imagination, and influenced by Kant, the ‘integrated aesthetic’ theory 
aims to be inclusive regarding potential layers of aesthetic experience, with the senses, 
attention to perceptual qualities, imagination, emotion and, to some extent, knowledge 
playing a role, depending on the particular aesthetic situation (Brady 1998, 2003). 
‘Syncretism’ weaves together various layers of appreciation, such as imagination and 
scientific knowledge, making natural beauty central to the good life (Moore, 2008). 
Finally, Heyd (2001) argues that the ‘many stories’ of nature shape aesthetic valuing 
and can function to highlight various aesthetic qualities, potentially engaging the 
appreciator more deeply than scientific facts. All of these positions may be described as 
forms of critical pluralism, in so far as they do not simply accept the views of scientific 
cognitivism. Critically-engaged forms of pluralism, especially ones that are watchful of 
trivial, sentimental or overly humanising aesthetic judgments (Hepburn, 2001), provide 
promising ways to move the contemporary debate forward. 
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4. Aesthetics, Environmental Conservation, and Policy 
 
Environmental aesthetic judgments and the articulation of aesthetic values have been 
intimately bound up with efforts to conserve nature, and the role of aesthetics in 
environmental conservation policy is well recognised within the environmental 
aesthetics scholarship. For example, in the late 1970s the environmental philosopher 
Eugene Hargrove briefly traced how different aesthetic categories, the beautiful, the 
picturesque, the sublime, and the interesting, exerted considerable influence on the 
development of environmental attitudes in the US, and in turn various landscape 
preservation designations in the 1800s, including the founding of Yosemite and 
Yellowstone National Parks (Hargrove, 1979). Similarly, Selman and Swanwick (2010) 
have provided a potted history of the role of ‘natural beauty’ in landscape legislation 
policy in the UK, starting from the 1949 England and Wales National Parks and Access 
to the Countryside Act, and its relation to other natural aesthetic categories such as the 
sublime, and the picturesque (see also Brady, 2003: 226-233).  
However, there are a number of issues that environmental aesthetic theorists, and 
others from across environmental philosophy, continue to grapple with: to what extent 
should aesthetics play a role in environmental conservation decision-making, 
particularly in relation to other types of value? Upon whose aesthetic judgments should 
conservation proceed? Are aesthetic values too ‘subjective’ as a basis on which to form 
conservation policies? In this section, we will consider some of the existing positions 
from across the subfield, in response to these questions. 
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In environmental aesthetics, concerns about conservation and preservation of 
environments are often taken for granted, with the general goal being to show how 
aesthetic valuing of nature is possible, philosophically-speaking. Within environmental 
philosophy, there is more attention to environmental ethics than aesthetics, but several 
scholars have been interested in showing how the two are connected. This connection 
is made by exploring whether and to what extent aesthetic experience and value may 
be said to support moral attitudes toward the environment (Brady, 2003; Carlson & 
Lintott, 2007; Saito, 2017a; Carlson, 2010, 2018; Richardson et al., 2019; Welchman, 
2018). For example, the position known as ‘aesthetic preservationism’ holds that 
through the sensitive perception characteristic of aesthetic attention and the discovery 
of beauty, majesty, and so on, people may develop care and respect for nature. On this 
philosophical view, a particular kind of aesthetic awareness potentially feeds into ethical 
attitudes and forms of environmental action (Hargrove, 1989; Thompson, 1995; Fisher 
2003; Rolston 2002; Parsons, 2008). The focus of this kind of approach tends to be 
unmodified rather than modified natural areas, following the tendency of preservationist 
arguments in favour of protecting designated ‘wilderness’ areas. 
 
Hettinger’s (2008) ‘aesthetic protectionism’, a version of aesthetic preservationism, 
argues that valuing natural beauty can serve as an important motivation for protecting 
the environment, as long as sufficient justification can be provided, for example, some 
kind of objectivity found, for aesthetic judgments of nature. Welchman (2018) takes a 
different view, arguing that aesthetic experience of nature is a component of human 
flourishing, which provides a justification for protecting the environment for current and 
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future generations of people. To support these kinds of positions, Hettinger and others 
draw on high-profile cases where natural beauty has been cited as a reason to prevent 
development of natural areas, such as the long-standing dispute concerning oil-drilling 
in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska, or the attempt to quarry Roineabhal 
mountain on the Isle of Harris in Scotland (Hettinger, 2008; Brady, 2019). 
 
Stewart and Johnson (2018) argue that aesthetic preservationism is problematic 
because it focuses too narrowly on positive aesthetic values and ignores the problem of 
how aesthetics is implicated in cases of environmental or ecological harm. For example, 
they argue that aesthetics can ‘obfuscate environmental degradation in the public 
memory’ in relation to attractive public parks that have been created from landfill sites, 
hiding the problem of massive human consumption and the waste it creates (2018: 
444).  
 
In some contrast, Brady et al. (2018) object to the focus on wild places implicit in 
aesthetic preservationism and argue that a broader approach is needed, namely, one 
that recognises people-nature relationships in the context of both modified and wild 
environments. They also point to the importance of being sensitive to the changing 
narratives of places, in contrast to aesthetic preservationism, which does not explicitly 
acknowledge the role of indigenous communities in shaping environmental history 
(O’Neill, Holland, & Light, 2008). Educating people about how a particular place has 
evolved or using aesthetic design elements to illustrate a place’s changing history can 
address one concern raised by Stewart and Johnson.  
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Other cases of aesthetic-ethical conflict which have attracted attention in the public 
discourse include the taste for manicured green lawns, which require heavy 
management and use of weed killers that are harmful to plants and wildlife (Hall, 2011), 
and the many harmful, invasive species that are found to be aesthetically appealing, 
such as Rhododendron ponticum in the UK or Lupinus nootkatensis in Iceland. 
Conversely, there are examples of landscapes judged to be of high ecological value that 
are aesthetically disvalued. For example, Parsons (1995) describes how densely 
vegetated patches of woodland that are important for biodiversity, are consistently 
attributed low aesthetic value as compared to more open grassy areas, while Prior and 
Brady (2017) outline how rewilding efforts will likely give rise to challenging aesthetic 
qualities, including ugly and unscenic landscapes. Additionally, Lintott asserts that 
animals that are ‘aesthetically unappealing or aesthetically unimpressive’ (2008: 381), 
such as bats and snakes, do not garner the same level of public interest or support as 
compared to more charismatic species, when it comes to conservation efforts on their 
behalf. This has led to efforts to develop what is termed an ecological aesthetic 
(Gobster, 1999; Gobster et al., 2007), or an eco-friendly aesthetic (Lintott, 2008), 
wherein aesthetic and ecological values are aligned, particularly as a result of 
landscape design interventions and educational programmes.6 
 
                                               
6 Since this time, there has been some empirical research tentatively demonstrating that people may 
tolerate or even prefer the aesthetic qualities of high biodiversity over low biodiversity green spaces in 
urban contexts, such as urban meadows over amenity lawns, though this preference is linked most 
strongly to individuals who are already supportive of conservation efforts, and when such spaces still 
display signs of human maintenance (see Hoyle et al., 2017; Hoyle et al., 2019; Southon et al., 2017).  
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While few, if any, philosophers hold the view that aesthetic value ought to trump other 
values in environmental decision-making, some have argued more explicitly that justice, 
respect, and other ethical concepts and attitudes must have a role alongside aesthetic 
appreciation, or be integrated into aesthetic concerns (Saito, 2017a; Carlson, 2018; 
Parsons, 2018). A significant barrier to giving a prominent role to aesthetic value in 
environmental decision-making and conservation is the claim that aesthetic value is 
subjective, as expressed through the common-sense belief that ‘beauty lies in the eye 
of the beholder’. Values which are underpinned by scientific or quantitative support, or 
values that are assumed to be objective, are often taken more seriously. Further to this, 
Stan Godlovitch (1998) has argued that aesthetic values need to be measurable and in 
turn rankable, if they are to be taken seriously within conservation decision-making, 
stating that ‘only if natural aesthetic value is measurable will it stand a chance of 
influencing conservation priorities. Otherwise it will be swept aside as just another 
vague externality or subjective attachment’ (Godlovitch, 1998: 122). An unfortunate 
result of identifying aesthetic judgments with subjective preferences is that, for example, 
a community’s expressed aesthetic enjoyment of a beautiful place may be considered 
only a matter of opinion, having little force when compared to the monetary valuation of 
that same space (Brady, 2019). Several philosophers working in environmental 
aesthetics have recognized the importance of showing that aesthetic judgments are not 
the same as subjective preferences and ought to be viewed as important, rather than 
trivial (Thompson, 1995; Hepburn, 2001; Eaton, 2008; Hettinger, 2008).  
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There are long-standing debates concerning the subjectivity or objectivity of values in 
philosophy, and these provide arguments that are aimed at challenging unsubstantiated 
assumptions about the nature of moral and aesthetic values. With respect to aesthetic 
value, one influential effort is David Hume’s concept of the ‘standard of taste’ (Hume, 
1965). He understood that divergence in our aesthetic responses was common and that 
a standard of taste is needed to settle disputes and indicate what is aesthetically 
valuable or good. This standard is set by an appeal to competent or ‘ideal’ judges, or 
people with relevant experience and developed aesthetic sensibilities (Hume, 1965). 
Hume was concerned with the arts, but we suggest that in the environmental context, 
ideal judges might range from artists, poets, and literary figures to ecologists, botanists, 
ornithologists, geologists, meteorologists, and others. What makes them competent 
would be familiarity with the aesthetic objects in question, an interest in aesthetic 
qualities rather than only intellectual/scientific interest, and awareness of how to 
separate out personal bias from their judgments (for example, a poet who suffers from 
herpetophobia). Exactly what constitutes an ideal judge is contentious in the literature, 
but the key point is that Hume, and others following his views, outline an objective basis 
for aesthetic judgments, rather than assume they are simply expressions of individual 
preferences (Goldman, 1985; Ross, 2011). 
 
In environmental aesthetics, attempts to establish the objectivity of aesthetic judgments 
may be seen as a route to establishing the non-triviality of aesthetic values and the 
possibility of their playing a stronger role in the practical context of conservation. Based 
on scientific cognitivism, Carlson holds that knowledge of the natural sciences provides 
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an objective grounding for aesthetic judgments (Carlson, 2000, 2010). A more inclusive 
position which tries to capture the range of reasonable and justifiable aesthetic 
judgments is put forward by Hettinger (2008), who argues for a robust form of critical 
pluralism. He argues that there are many legitimate bases for aesthetic judgments, not 
only those drawn from the sciences. Inspired by the ideas of Kant (2000) and Sibley 
(2001), Brady (2003) contends that aesthetic judgments have an intersubjective 
grounding: individual judgments may have their own particular inflections based on a 
person’s specific background knowledge, experience, etc., yet agreement with other 
aesthetic judgments of the same aesthetic object may be established. Nicolson (1959) 
provides a historical example of the intersubjectivity of aesthetic judgments, outlining 
how Romantic era writers shaped commonly-held perceptions of mountainous 
landscapes. Previously, such landscapes were judged negatively as barren wastelands, 
but Romantic writers and poets effectively helped usher in a dramatic change, wherein 
mountains were perceived to be majestic and awe-inspiring, which are now so 
commonly-held aesthetic judgements amongst the general population that we tend not 
to question them. Rather than being private expressions of individual taste then, 
aesthetic judgments may be based upon a set of critical activities that are practiced and 
developed in a public context. So, although there is ongoing debate, there is also 
considerable work which argues against the assumption that aesthetic value is a 
subjective matter. 
  
To what extent have these conceptual discussions been influential beyond philosophical 
debates? This is not easy to gauge, but it is possible to pin down a couple of ways that 
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environmental aesthetics has impacted other disciplines and policy. First, philosophers 
have been critical not only of the narrow scope of the visual landscape assessments 
which have been used, for example, as the basis of landscape designations, but also of 
attempts to quantify natural beauty. In early discussions of this issue, Eaton (1989: 81) 
describes what she calls the ‘fallacy of confusing objectivity with quantifiability’. The 
problem is that objectivity in landscape assessment is assumed to be possible only 
through quantitative methods, and she points to an alternative informed by philosophical 
methods: ‘Objectivity is not a matter of reducing things to numeric formulas; it is a 
matter of grounding one’s claims in evidence in such a way that interpersonal 
agreement or disagreement is meaningful’ (1989: 81). Carlson (1977) argues that 
quantitative work on landscape preferences produces an incomplete and sometimes 
misleading understanding of a landscape’s aesthetic qualities, and that qualitative 
approaches are essential. 
 
More recently, Cooper et al. (2016) critique the view that aesthetic and spiritual values 
can be captured adequately by cultural ecosystem services because these kinds of 
values are non-instrumental and not measurable through neoclassical economic 
valuation methods. Their case is based upon both theoretical arguments and empirical 
evidence. In another critique, Kenter et al. (2015) argue that it is possible to identify 
shared cultural values, and that participatory and deliberative processes provide a 
promising empirical method and alternative for capturing aesthetic and spiritual values, 
compared to forms of monetary evaluation. 
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Second, philosophical approaches have been drawn upon to provide a conceptual 
understanding of various ideas, such as natural beauty and aesthetic qualities. Selman 
and Swanwick (2010; see also Swanwick, Selman, and Knight, 2006) discuss 
conceptual debates in environmental aesthetics in their study of ‘natural beauty’ in 
landscape policy in the UK. They also provide evidence of both individual and 
convergent views of natural beauty based on empirical research with stakeholders. 
Thompson and Travlou (2009) refer to environmental aesthetics in their critical review 
report to the Forestry Commission concerning woodland perceptions, aesthetics, 
affordances and experiences. They note that there has been progress beyond the 
scenic model, but also remark that: ‘Understanding what mechanisms lie behind these 
responses [of the wider public] and drawing on a theory of aesthetics that embraces the 
perception of beauty alongside the cultural (including the historical) and biological (or 
ecological) dimensions of the aesthetic would seem to be an important way forward.’ 
(2009: 3.6) Also, various philosophers working in environmental aesthetics have drawn 
upon their disciplinary knowledge to communicate to policymakers (for example, see 
Parsons, 2010; Coates et al., 2014; Kenter et al., 2014). In the next section, we return to 
a consideration of empirical approaches, specifically an examination of aesthetic values 
and qualities concerning ecological restoration outcomes. 
 
5. Aesthetic Value and Ecological Restoration 
 
As with discussions pertaining to the broader topic of environmental conservation, 
ecological restoration has a complicated, and often-fraught, relationship with aesthetic 
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values. The most widely used definition of ecological restoration has been formulated by 
the Society for Ecological Restoration International, and is stated within their Primer on 
Ecological Restoration as follows: ‘ecological restoration is the process of assisting the 
recovery of an ecosystem that has been degraded, damaged, or destroyed’ (Society for 
Ecological Restoration International Science & Policy Working Group, 2004: 3). Such 
assistance toward recovery aims to restore the historical conditions that existed before 
an ecosystem was degraded, damaged or destroyed (ibid.: 12). The ‘provision of 
aesthetic amenities’ (ibid.: 4) is listed elsewhere within the Primer as a possible goal of 
ecological restoration, but only inasmuch as this is a secondary aim; even if this aim 
were absent, the activity being undertaken would still classify as ecological restoration. 
 
For some, aesthetics, and, importantly, not only that which is confined to ‘amenity 
value’, is more central to ecological restoration outcomes than this. Morrison (1987: 
160) lists ‘physical, biological and aesthetic characteristics’ of a pre-disturbed site as 
qualities that are restored through ecological restoration, while Higgs, who in his work 
foregrounds the role of design in ecological restoration, has argued that our 
understanding of what constitutes ‘good’ ecological restoration should embrace 
aesthetics, as well as other social and cultural valuations of restored systems (Higgs, 
1997, 2003). For others, the centrality of aesthetics within ecological restoration means 
that ‘the activity it [ecological restoration] resembles most closely is art’ (Turner, 1990: 
48), and that a sense of beauty is important within ecological restoration, as beauty 
‘...tells us what is relevant, what is likely, what is proper, what is fruitful’ in restoration 
efforts (ibid.: 49). Refining Turner, Jordan III identifies ecological restoration as a 
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specific type of artistic practice, namely the performing arts, arguing that restoration is 
akin to a number of performative genres such as comedy and ritual (Jordan III, 2003: 
160-194). 
 
Artists themselves have explored the aesthetic-restoration interplay head-on, 
recognising the artistic potential of ecological restoration actions. Blandy et al. (1998) 
provide a useful synopsis of some land and performance artists that have used land art 
as a means of restoring degraded ecosystems, including 7000 Oaks Action (1982) by 
Joseph Beuys, a reforestation ‘action’ carried out in  Kassel, Germany, and Betty 
Beaumont’s Ocean Landmark Project (1980), which involved the construction of an 
artificial coral reef system in the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of New York; subsequent 
multimedia installations documented the project as a means ‘...to raise public 
awareness to the necessity of active participation in ecological and cultural restoration’ 
(Blandy et al., 1998: 238). Other instances of artists-as-restorations include Harriet 
Feigenbaum, who carried out land reclamation of strip mines in Lackawanna Valley, 
Pennsylvania (Murray, 1991), while in Boston a group of artists and landscape 
architects joined together in 1989 to form Reclamation Artists, who have undertaken 
land restorations in and around the city (Brigham, 1993).  
 
Further to this, it has been argued that various forms of environmental art can act as a 
conduit between restoration efforts and the public, giving ‘...form and voice to restored 
landscapes, thereby deepening our awareness and appreciation of natural processes’ 
(Lambert and Khosla, 2000: 110). Meanwhile, Sayre (2010) provides an example that 
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raises some challenges regarding the place of the arts within ecological restoration. 
Sayre analyses the work of art critic John Van Dyke to demonstrate that within Van 
Dyke’s ‘aesthetic-mystical’ writing about the arid and semiarid deserts of the 
southwestern region of the USA, he ‘misread’ them as sublime ‘pristine’ wilderness 
landscapes (Sayre, 2010: 24). This aesthetic still influences how contemporary 
restorationists determine the ‘correct’ goals of their practices in the region, which, Sayre 
argues, results in aesthetic ‘satisfaction’ but an ahistorical landscape state (ibid.: 30).7 
 
Regardless of whether aesthetics is considered to be a central or secondary goal of 
ecological restoration, or whether or not ecological restoration is conceptualised as an 
artistic practice, there will always be aesthetic repercussions stemming from restoration 
activities. The aesthetic qualities and characters that arise from ecological restoration 
practices are often inseparable from the environmental ethical values held by 
restorationists, insomuch as these qualities and characters are a sensorial 
representation of a particular environmental ethic. For example, the messy and 
unscenic aesthetic qualities that are likely to emerge from rewilding - a particular type of 
ecological restoration that emphasises the role of natural processes so that restored 
ecosystems are self-sustaining and self-regulating - are a direct outcome of an 
environmental ethic that rejects continuous human management of landscapes and 
ecosystems (Prior and Brady, 2017). By contrast, restoration undertaken with the goal 
of producing a heritage park that seeks to hold in tension a dialectical relationship 
                                               
7 It should be noted, however, that there is much debate within the ecological restoration literature 
regarding whether restoring to a historical landscape state is feasible or even desirable, particularly in 
light of rapid environmental change and climate destabilization (see Prior and Smith (2019) for a 
discussion of historical baselines in ecological restoration theory).  
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between nature and culture, can lead to neat, orderly, and legible aesthetic qualities and 
the emergence of a landscape character of functional beauty (Brady et al., 2018). 
 
Much of the literature that has considered the implications of ecological restoration for 
ecosystem and landscape aesthetics, has done so from an environmental preferences 
perspective. Broadly, this research seeks to empirically investigate people's’ aesthetic 
preferences for different ecological restoration outcomes. Junker and Buchecker (2008) 
consider the potential conflict between ‘lay’ aesthetic preferences and ‘expert’ ecological 
knowledge of different post-restoration river systems; using computer-generated images 
of different post-restoration scenarios of an undefined Swiss river to test aesthetic 
preferences, the authors conclude that there is a strong aesthetic preference for 
perceived ‘naturalness’ (as opposed to river channels that are evidently highly 
modified), which aligns with ‘expert’ assessments of likely ecological quality post-
restoration. Likewise, Cottet, Piégay and Bornette (2013) demonstrate that there are no 
substantial differences between ‘lay’ and ‘expert’ judgments of aesthetic and ecological 
value of a wetland system in the east of France, while McCormick et al. (2015) arrive at 
a similar conclusion following an investigation of aesthetic and ecological assessments 
of a river system in Auckland, New Zealand.  
 
A problem occurs, however, when the aesthetic qualities that emerge from restoration 
practices conflict with public aesthetic preferences; this is certainly a concern for the 
public acceptance of rewilding strategies (Prior and Brady, 2017). Paul Gobster 
provides an example of a restoration project in DuPage County in west Chicago that 
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was eventually terminated due to public resistance. Restoration ecologists developed a 
plan to restore 7,000 acres of densely wooded land to an oak savanna and open prairie 
ecosystem, that would have necessitated the felling of approximately half a million 
trees, and the removal of deer populations. While Gobster found that there was ‘little 
wholesale opposition to the restoration’; rather, there were concerns over specific types 
of restoration practices (Gobster, 1997: 33-34). When concerns were expressed, 
aesthetic values were constantly invoked: the removal of the trees and brush would 
leave an open, ‘barren’ landscape that was ascribed with negative value; the trees had 
formerly screened ‘urban sights and sounds’ and buildings and roads; the loss of ‘forest 
character’ was assumed to be deleterious on adjacent property values; and recreation 
and wildlife values, including the opportunity to see deer, would decrease (Gobster 
1997). 
 
6. New Directions for Environmental Aesthetics 
 
So far in this paper, we have provided an overview of the major theoretical approaches 
and concepts that have preoccupied environmental aestheticians over the last fifty 
years or so. In this final section, we want to explore new directions for future research 
within the environmental aesthetics subfield. There are many neglected areas that 
would be fruitfully addressed in future research: more discussion of artistic and other 
creative representations, expressions and interventions with respect to the natural 
environment; new explorations of environments that are modified by humans; a greater 
response to the critical environmental issues and changes of today, such as global 
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climate change, mass extinctions, species loss; adopting a more global perspective 
which engages with a variety of cultural aesthetic approaches; more exploration of 
negative aesthetic qualities, as well as experiences of places that are fast disappearing 
(glaciers, coral reefs). We shall discuss only a few of these, for there are many, indeed, 
given the relative infancy of the subfield, especially as compared to art-based aesthetics 
scholarship. In discussing new directions, it should become even clearer how 
environmental aesthetics fruitfully contributes to the burgeoning philosophical literature 
on the relationships between people and nature. 
  
In this review, we have seen that there are moments within the history of environmental 
aesthetics where there has been some consideration of visual forms of media, most 
notably landscape painting, from an aesthetics perspective. We have also seen that 
environmental aestheticians have attempted to differentiate artistic from environmental 
experiences, so that nature is appreciated ‘on its own terms’, rather than from an artistic 
perspective; again, landscape painting is a notably conspicuous artistic genre within this 
discussion, particularly in relation to the assumed incorrectness of viewing landscape as 
a static pictorial scene (see especially Carlson, 2000). Nonetheless, we want to suggest 
that the subfield would benefit from interrogating the aesthetic qualities and values of 
media representations of nature and the environment, in a manner that accounts for the 
plurality of such media representations, which includes but is not limited to photography, 
film, music, and ecological and environmental art works, given the importance of these 
forms of media in communicating but also developing positive valuations of nature, 
landscape, and the environment.  
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Currently, such work is very sparse within what can be broadly construed as the 
philosophical environmental aesthetics literature. Environmental aesthetic theories have 
been brought to bear on landscape photography (see Friday, 1999), with particular 
attention being paid to photographic representations of the aesthetics of environmental 
degradation (Bürkner, 2014; Kane, 2018). Analyses of the photographic work of Edward 
Burtynsky are notable here, wherein the notion of the ‘industrial’ or ‘toxic’ sublime as an 
aesthetic category has been developed (Schuster, 2013; Ray, 2016; Zehle, 2008). 
 
Scholars have also addressed how some artworks may support ecological flourishing 
and enhance a positive human-nature-relationship. Covering a wide range of artistic 
forms, including literature, architecture, photography, and installation art, Malcolm Miles 
(2014) has written a sustained account of different art works and art activism that 
cultivate an ‘eco-aesthetic’, as a means of imagining alternative futures to 
environmental collapse.8 However, it has also been argued that some creative 
interventions directly in the land may constitute an aesthetic or ethical ‘affront’, being 
harmful to their surrounding environment (Carlson, 2000; Boaz Simus, 2007; Boetzkes, 
2010). For example, although aesthetically attractive, many of the artworks by Christo 
and Jeanne-Claude may be said to use nature merely as a backdrop, with the artefact 
taking centre-stage. 
 
                                               
8 See also Klaver (2014) on the role of landscape painting and photography in ‘catalyz[ing] an 
environmental imagination’ (p. 137). 
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We think that scholarship on media representations of nature can be productively 
developed in ways that do not necessitate the non-differentiation of environmental and 
artistic aesthetics, and instead develop from a position that considers artistic 
representations as mediators between, and expressions of, existing and possible future 
relationships between people and nature.  
 
Overwhelmingly, environmental aesthetics has centred on the aesthetic qualities and 
values of landscapes that are perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be largely untrammelled 
by humans; strongly natural environments have dominated discussions about the 
aesthetics of nature. To be sure, this reflects a wider trend in environmental philosophy 
wherein cultural landscapes, particularly urbanised ones, have tended to be either 
ignored or constructed as places of disvalue (see Light, 2001). This situation is, 
however, starting to be rectified, if only in a rather piecemeal fashion. For example, 
gardens and gardening have received attention within the environmental aesthetics 
literature. Here, gardens have been highlighted as significant places where creative 
interactions and relationships of co-dependence between humans and nature may 
develop (Brady et al, 2018; Cooper, 2006), and as places of multisensory pleasure 
(Ross, 2007). Scholars have also dissected the aesthetics of different gardening styles, 
leading some to argue, for instance, that Japanese garden aesthetics exhibit a 
‘respectful attitude toward nature’ as compared to Western formal gardens (Saito, 
2017b: 154; Saito, 1998c), while others point to the ‘artificial’ qualities of Japanese 
gardens that create ‘an idealized version of nature’ (Carlson, 2000: 171). 
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Agricultural landscapes have also been examined, with emphasis placed on the 
aesthetic qualities and values of different modes of agricultural practices, including 
‘industrial’ and ‘traditional’ farming (Arribas Herguedas, 2018; Brady et al., 2018; 
Arntzen and Brady, 2008; Carlson, 2000), alongside other productive landscapes, such 
as wind farms (Gray, 2014) and other ‘energy landscapes’ (Jørgensen & Jørgensen, 
2018). Further, the environmental aesthetics literature has tentatively shifted its gaze 
towards urban landscapes, with an edited collection that contains essays on urban 
aesthetics and multisensory aesthetic appreciation of cities (Berleant & Carlson, 2007). 
Nonetheless, such ‘modified environments’, wherein a given landscape is evidently the 
outcome of both human and non-human forces (see Brady et al., 2018), are still 
relatively neglected, not to mention marginalised landscapes that elide being easily 
categorised as clearly natural or cultural landscapes, such as urban wastelands (Gandy, 
2013) and novel ecosystems that are the outcome of inadvertent human activity (Higgs, 
2017). We think it is important that environmental aesthetics scholarship continues to 
move beyond natural environments, not least because modified environments are ones 
in which a growing majority of the world’s human population encounter non-human 
nature. Given emerging debates about the Anthropocene, environmental aesthetics can 
also make a valuable contribution by reflecting on issues at the intersection of 
aesthetics and ethics, as they relate to human influences on the natural world.  
 
We have established that the philosophical environmental aesthetics literature has 
attended to environmental conservation and ecological restoration, yet we think that 
environmental aesthetics scholarship should be extended to accommodate other 
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pressing environmental issues. Philosophers have extensively examined climate 
change from an ethics perspective, covering a broad terrain of issues, including climate 
justice (particularly from an intergenerational perspective), geoengineering, carbon 
budgets, and climate adaptation policies (Attfield, 2014; Gardiner et al., 2010 Preston, 
2016). But there are relevant aesthetic questions to be explored, as well, which go hand 
in hand with concerns about ethics and justice. In aesthetic terms, what kind of world 
will be left to future generations in light of the catastrophic effects of climate breakdown? 
How will losses affecting people and nature also become losses in aesthetic value, for 
example, the loss of island and coastal landscapes that many people call home, or the 
loss of beautiful bird species (Brady, 2014; Ziser & Sze, 2007)? Might these aesthetic 
losses compound ecological grief (Cunsolo & Ellis, 2018)? Further, although there has 
been some attention to aesthetic value and non-human animals (Parsons, 2007; 
Tafalla, 2017), philosophical scholarship has thus far neglected the role of aesthetics in 
biodiversity loss and extinction events. 
 
Finally, environmental aesthetics tends to draw largely on North American, European 
and Anglo-understandings of environment, with some work on Japanese aesthetics of 
nature and gardens (Saito, 1998c, 2017b; Nguyen, 2018). Chinese scholars have taken 
an interest in contemporary environmental aesthetics in the West but have been 
developing their own distinctive theories as well, such as ecoaesthetics, which grapples 
with the relationship between aesthetics and ethics (Cheng, 2013; Carlson, 2019). 
Taking a cue from Saito (2010), environmental aesthetics ought to take up opportunities 
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to extend philosophical understandings of aesthetic valuing of nature to other global 
traditions, and to engage with contemporary debates beyond Western perspectives.  
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